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Conflict of Laws-Torts-California
By JAmms B. SCHNAXE* and JAivms MuIAn**
IT WAS just a quarter of a century ago that Justice Cardozo wrote
words which now seem hopelessly dated:
Fields there are in the domain of law where fundamental concep-
tions have been developed to their uttermost conclusions by the
organon of logic. One finds this method of decision in much of the
law of bills and notes .... [and] again in the law of real estate ....
One finds it again in one of the most baffling subjects of legal
science, the so-called Conflict of Law. We deal there with the applica-
tion of law in space. The walls of the compartments must be firm,
the lines of demarcation plain, or there will be overlappings and
encroachments with incongruities and clashes. In such circumstances,
the finality of the rule is in itself a jural end. I do not mean that even
in this sphere the judge who seeks to reach the heart of a concept,
its inmost implications, may not find, when he has gained the core,
that the concept is one with policy and justice. . . . I find logic to
have been more remorseless here, more blind to final causes, than
it has been in other fields. Very likely it has been too remorseless.'
It is not our intention to discuss on a theoretical basis the development
of torts conflict of laws in California over the last forty-five years. It
is our intention to ascertain whether the California courts are still
locked in the Ice Age thinking of the first Restatement, or whether
this State is moving forward boldly, intelligently, and with some sensi-
tivity to the need to do justice in the particular case.
We have seen in the past decade landmark cases such as Grant v.
McAuliffe,2 Emery v. Emery,3 and Bernkrant v. Fowler,4 in which
the California Supreme Court, and more particularly Justice Traynor,
took great leaps forward in reaching sound decisions not only from
the standpoint of the litigants before the court, but also from the
standpoint of an intelligent development of choice of laws in multi-
state transactions. However, we have also seen regrettable lapses and
backward steps. In the egregiously erroneous decision of Victor v.
0 A.B., University of Arizona, 1947; LL.B., Stanford University, 1950; Instructor,
Conflict of Laws, San Francisco Law School; member, California Bar.
** LL.B., Hastings College of the Law, 1963; Deputy Attorney General, State of
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I CAPnozo, THE PARADoxEs or LEoA ScimcE 67-68 (1928).
241 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
345 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
455 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
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Sperry" (where the California Supreme Court unaccountably refused
to hear the case), no violation of the public policy of this State was
found in limiting a California plaintiff negligently injured by a Cali-
fornia defendant to a preposterously small measure of damages under
the law of Mexico where the accident fortuitously occurred. Similarly,
Wilson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.6 left little to be admired in its
bland assumption that a three month time limitation on a widow's
right to bring a wrongful death action in an air crash was not violative
of California public policy.7 The issue we think the practicing lawyer
is most likely to have presented to him, and which we will attempt
to discuss, is not what the California courts have done in the past,
but what they will do when confronted with some of the more obvious
problems in multi-state tort cases, and in particular, those involving
automobile accidents outside the boundaries of California.
Californians are without a doubt the most peripatetic people in
the world. Daily, they cross and recross state boundaries in pursuit of
business and pleasure. It is not surprising, therefore, that the auto-
mobile has played a substantial role in formulating both the California
and contemporary choice of laws rules.
If you were to ask the average practitioner in this State what law
would govern a tort case with multi-state elements, the inevitable
reply would be the law of the place of wrong.8 The first Restatement'
5 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (1958), petition for hearing denied, 163 Cal.
App. 2d at 526, 329 P.2d at 733 (1958).
6210 Cal. App. 2d 451, 26 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1962).
7 The Wilson decision might well be explained by the apparent absence of any
substantial connection between California and the place of the crash (Texas) or the
injured parties. The case is disturbing nonetheless in its failure to see a problem along
these lines.
8 E.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 ,P.2d 218 (1955); Grant v. McAuliffe,
41 Cal. 2d 859, 862, 264 P.2d 944, 946 (1953) (dictum); Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal.
362, 366, 10 P.2d 63, 65 (1932). But cf. the following in which the conflicts problem
was ignored, Layne v. Kirby, 208 Cal. 694, 284 Pac. 441 (1930); Draper v. Hellman
Commercial Trust & Say. Bank, 203 Cal. 26, 263 Pac. 240 (1928); Montgomery v.
McLaury, 143 Cal. 83, 76 Pac. 964 (1904).
9 BRESTATEmmNT, CoNFLcr or LAws (1934):
§ 377. THE PLAcE OF WRONG.
The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor
liable for an alleged tort takes place.
§ 378. LA w GovERN PLAnTI's INJURY.
The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury.
§ 379. LAw GovRnsNG LiABmrrY-CREATING CoNDucT.
Except as stated in § 382 [Duty or Privilege to Act], the law of the place of wrong
determines
(a) whether a person is responsible for harm he has caused only if he intended it,
offered this easy solution to practically all questions, and not just
the basic problem of the rules of the road. Almost from its promul-
gation, the Restatement rule of choice of laws has been circumvented,
villified, attacked, and held up to ridicule. In case after case the courts
have been forced to engraft exceptions in order to do substantial jus-
tice, and on those occasions when a court has followed the strict letter
of the Restatement rule, the result has been criticized as unjust and
unrealistic. It is not surprising, therefore, that a strong force should
assert itself in the California Supreme Court calling for a re-analysis
and re-examination of the premises of the "standard" choice of laws
rule. Justice Traynor's departure from the Restatement rule in Grant v.
McAuliffe and Emery v. Emery has been fully discussed elsewhere0
and need not be re-examined here. Suffice it to say that the Grant re-
jection of the harsh Arizona rule which precluded the survival of tort
causes of action, and the Emery application of the law of the domicile
to govern the question of intra-family tort immunity, have made sen-
sible and necessary departures from the Restatement rule of lex loci
delicti.
Let us now consider whether or not the California court would
utilize the same approach of adjudication as distinguished from auto-
mation in handling questions of wrongful death damage limitations,
owner's responsibility, and guest status. All three problems may be
fitted into a not-too-factually-complex hypothetical case.
Don and his wife, Donna, residents of California, invited their
neighbors, Peter and Paula, to go with them to the New York World's
Fair. Although they shared expenses with Don and Donna, it is clear
that under California law, and probably the law of most other states,
Peter and Paula were simply social guests. Donna owned the car and
had considerable other property, whereas Don had only modest means.
Donna's automobile liability policy provided that coverage was limited
to the United States. On the way back from the World's Fair the
couples stopped in Buffalo, New York, where Don and Donna had too
much to drink. Leaving Donna asleep at a motel on the American side,
(b) whether a person is responsible for unintended harm he has caused only if he
was negligent,
(c) whether a person is responsible for harm he has caused irrespective of his
intention or the care which he has exercised.
10 See, e.g., 1957 CAL. LAw REVIsioN CoMnMN REcouMNDoATmoN & SruDn RE-
LATING TO CHOICE OF LAW GOVERNING SuItIVAL OF AcrioNs J-7; Currie, Survival of
Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv.
205 (1958); Sumner, Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions, 9 HASTINGs L.J.
128 (1958); Note, 68 HAzy. L. Rev. 1260 (1955); Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1288 (1954);
Note, 27 So. CAL. L. REv. 468 (1954); Note, 1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 380 (1954).
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Don drove Peter and Paula to Canada where an accident caused by
his drunken misbehavior proved fatal to all three.
In the suit brought in California on behalf of the children of Peter
and Paula against Donna and Don's estate, at last three choice of law
problems are readily apparent. First, are the plaintiffs barred by the
Draconian Guest Statute of Ontario which prohibits recovery against
a host where no compensation is paid? Second, assuming that Ontario
limits wrongful death damages to 30,000 dollars, shall Ontario or
California law govern the measure of damages? Third, may Donna
seek refuge from vicarious responsibility under the doctrine of Scheer v.
Rockne Motors Corp." since Don had been expressly admonished not
to take the car to Canada? Would Donna be immune in spite of the
fact that California, New York, and Ontario all provide for owner's
responsibility?
Guest Statutes and Lex Loci Delicti
Whether the guest statute of the place of wrong or the law of the
domicile of the parties and the place of creation of relationship should
apply, would seem to be answered by reference to the oft-cited case
of Loranger v. Nadeau2 which held that the law of the place of wrong
would be applied in preference to California's guest statute. There the
court did not even deign to discuss the fact that at least one of the
parties was domiciled in California and that other significant factors
connected California to the transaction, but held that the universal
rule was to apply the lex loci delicti. The only problem which con-
cerned the California'Supreme Court was whether or not the public
policy of this State would be offended by the application of the foreign
rule as to duty of care. However, in spite of the fact that Loranger has
been cited and followed by other California courts,'8 we submit that
the current court would not follow Loranger, but instead would adopt
at least the result and perhaps the reasoning of the landmark case of
Babcock v. Jackson.14
1168 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934). See also Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518,
329 P.2d 728 (1958).
12 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932); of. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289
P.2d 218 (1955); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Victor
v. Sperry, supra note 11.
1 Emery v. Emery, supra note 12; Grant v. McAuliffe, supra note 12; Victor
v. Sperry, supra note 11.
14 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). Babcock has
attracted a flurry of law review commentaries and promises to be a favorite of case
book authors and jurists for some time to come. See, e.g., Cavers, Cheatham, Currie,
Ehrenzweig, Leflar & Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in
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In Babcock the New York Court of Appeals refused to apply the
Ontario guest statute since both plaintiff and defendant were domi-
ciliaries of New York and the relationship was created in that state.
The only connecting factor with Ontario was the fortuitous occurrence
of the accident there. Judge Fuld rejected out of hand Restatement
of Conflict of Laws, section 384.16
It [the first Restatement's rule of lex loci delicti] had its conceptual
foundation in the vested rights doctrine, namely, that a right to re-
cover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the law of the jurisdiction
where the injury occurred and depends for its existence and extent
solely on such law ... [T]he vested rights doctrine has long since
been discredited .. . .More particularly, as applied to torts, the
theory ignores the interest which jurisdictions other than that where
the tort occurred may have in the resolution of particular issues. It is
for this very reason that, despite the advantages of certainty, ease of
application and predictability which it affords.., there has in recent
years been increasing criticism of the traditional rule by commenta-
tors and a judicial trend towards its abandonment or modification.' 6
The theoretical basis for the decision in Babcock was that a "center
of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine was more palatable
than the territorialistic vested rights theory of the Restatement rule.
The court stated:
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New
York and Ontario in this litigation, vis-4-vis the issue here presented,
makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably the
greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best
minimal. The present action involves injuries sustained by a New
York guest as the result of the negligence of a New York host in the
operation of an automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly in-
sured in New York, in the course of a week-end journey which began
and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship
with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the
accident occurred there.'7
Would Babcock be followed by the California Supreme Court,
requiring, as it must, the overruling sub silentio of Loranger v. Nadeau
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1212 (1963); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Con-
fusion in N.Y., 1963 DutE L.J. 1.
15 BESTAT.EmNT, CoNus icT OF LAws (1934):
§ 384. RECOGNrION OF FoREIGN CAUSE OF ACTION.
(1) If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action
will be recognized in other states.
(2) If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can
be had in any other state.
16 12 N.Y.2d at 477-78, 191 N.E.2d at 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47 (1963).
17 Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
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and all its progeny? Actually Loranger can be distinguished since the
facts were somewhat different. In Loranger the plaintiff was a resident
of one of the provinces of Canada and the relationship of guest and
host arose there rather than California (the accident occurred in Okla-
homa). Thus the larger number of contacts were not in California.
On the other hand the purely significant contacts were in California.
The defendant lived here, undoubtedly he garaged his car here, and
perhaps, most important, he purchased his insurance in California
from a company which based its rates in large part upon California
experience.
It must be assumed that Justice Traynor or others who might be
writing a majority opinion would hold that Loranger was no longer
representative of contemporary thinking. We believe that Loranger
would be overruled as archaic, mechanistic conflict of laws thinking
from another era. Obviously Ontario has no substantial governmental
interest in the outcome of the lawsuit at hand. If the children of Peter
and Paula go unrecompensed for their loss they will become charges,
not upon the Province of Ontario, but upon the State of California
where they reside. California has an overwhelming governmental in-
terest in providing not merely a forum, but also an adequate remedy
for the wrong inflicted upon these children, and such interest would
be held to prevail over the negligible interest of Ontario in the out-
come of the litigation. Although no court has thus far so held, the un-
thinking application of the lex loci delicti might, in this case, be held
to be so egregiously erroneous as to violate the due process clause.
The same result might be reached by yet another route. Professor
Ehrenzweig has argued persuasively for the application of the "Fore-
seeable and Insurable Laws" to guest statute problems. He would not
call for a grouping of contacts or an application of forum law under
Professor Currie's "Restrained and Enlightened Forum" approach.
Instead he would apply any law to protect the victim so long as that
law was one the defendant could foresee and against which he could
insure."8 Obviously Don and Donna could reasonably foresee the appli-
cation of California's guest statute and could have purchased insurance
(the premium would have been based upon California experience).
Professor Ehrenzweig would apply California's guest statute, not be-
cause a larger number of contacts were centered there, but simply
because the automobile was garaged (and was or could have been
18 ErmENzwme, CoNrmcr oF LAws § 220 (1962); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in
the Conflict of Laws--Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and
Insurable Laws" 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).
August, 1964] CONFLICTS-TORTS-CALIFORNIA
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insured) in California. 9 Ehrenz'weig's rule of "Foreseeable and Insur-
able Laws" appears to be a more workable alternative than the Re-
statement Second's grouping of contacts theory, since it avoids the
possibility of the erroneous application of one state's law simply be-
cause a numerically larger group of contacts might appear in that
state.20
Now let us consider another hypothetical case which presents
problems far more difficult to resolve. Assume that the accident oc-
curred in Arizona and that the defendant was guilty of no more than
ordinary negligence. In Arizona a host is responsible to his guest for
a failure to exercise ordinary caution.2 Which rule would the Cali-
fornia court select? Now the shoe would be on the other foot. The
attorneys for the insurance carrier for Donna and Don's estate would
strenuously urge that Babcock and indeed all of the forward-thinking
decisions in this field, would militate in favor of the application of
California law. Their argument would be that Arizona was totally
lacking in any) governmental interest in the outcome of the litigation
and that the decision would be the same whether one followed the
Babcock reasoning and grouped the contracts, or whether one followed
Professor Currie's view that the forum should apply its law in the
absence of a strong governmental interest in favor of the application
of foreign law,22 or whether one followed the view of those who are
revising the Restatement.3
We might observe parenthetically that the reporters of Restate-
ment Second and the cases seem to be following more the views of
Justice Traynor 24 and the New York court in Babcock, than the Currie
and Ehrenzweig insistence on primary use of the law of the forum.
Indeed the Babcock court quoted with approval and relied upon lan-
guage from the most recent tentative draft of Restatement Second.25
19 See also Comment, The Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51
CAwn. L. REv. 762, 782-91 (1963).
20 See, e.g., White v. Motor Vehicle Ace. Indemnification Corp., 39 Misc. 2d
678, 241 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1963). See also Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant
Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAw & CoN=MPn. NRoB. 700 (1963).
2 1 See Appendix.
22 CURSU, S.LEcTm ESSAYS ON Tim CoNFLicr OF LAWS passim (1963); M.
Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49
CALw. L. REv. 845 (1961). See also note 40 infra and accompanying text; Hill, Govern-
mental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. Cim L.
REv. 463 (1960).
2 3 REsTAZM E (SEcoND), CofircT OF LAws (TENT. DRAFr No. 8, 1963). See
also the symposium New Trends in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAw & CoNTE'N,. PsoB.
673 (1963) for evaluations of RESTATEmENT (SEcoND).
24 Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TENAS L. REv. 657 (1959).
25 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 283-84, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749-50 (1963).
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The general principle concerning choice of governing law of
Restatement Second is:
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant
relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their
rights and liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determin-
ing the state of most significant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the
forum will consider the issues, the character of the tort, the relevant
purposes of the tort rules involved.26
If the California court were to follow this principle the resulting
application of California's guest statute would seem to be inevitable.
One argument to the contrary would be as follows. The California
court would be free to consider not only the governmental interests
of the two states in the lawsuit and the parties, but also the actual
merits of the two rules under consideration. It might hold that Cali-
fornia was lacking in a sufficiently substantial governmental interest
to justify application of its guest statute to a foreign tort. Another
argument, which we submit should be rejected, is that the California
guest statute was never intended to have more than local application.
(More of this later.)
I The California court has been called upon on many occasions to
state what public policy, if any, underlies this statute. The California
guest law has been variously described as a measure intended to pro-
tect the vehicle owner from the claims of a hand-biting gratuitous
guest,27 as a measure intended to prevent fraudulent claims against
the owner 2 or, more accurately, as a measure intended to prevent
collusive claims by a host and guest on terms too friendly to one
another and too unfriendly toward a defenseless insurance carrier.29
26 BSTA 'rMNT (SEcoND), CONFrICT OF LAws § 379 (TENT. DRAar No. 8, 1963).
27 AhIgren v. At"gren, 185 Cal. App. 2d 216, 222, 8 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222 (1960).
28Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 432, 289 P.2d 218, 225 (1955); Weber v.
Pinyan, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 229, 70 P.2d 183, 185 (1937).
29 Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694 & n.1, 376 P.2d 70, 72 & n.1, 26 Cal. Rptr.
102, 104 & n.1 (1962), where Justice Peters observed: "The contention that there may
be insurance involved, and that to permit such actions in such cases will encourage
collusion, fraud and perjury, is also not convincing. Such arguments should be advanced
to the Legislature, and not to the courts. Where such danger has been made clear to the
August, 1964]
This raises the question of just what a court means when using
a term of such variable content as "public policy" or "fundamental
public policy" in the conflict of laws sense. It could not be said with
any degree of candor that California's guest statute represents public
policy in the sense of fundamental ideas of abstract justice or deep-
seated ideas of public morality. Indeed the supreme court of this State
has expressly rejected such a possibility in Loranger v. Nadeau.3°
There the court held that the narrow and sharply defined meaning
of public policy could not encompass California's guest statute. In
other words, the court held that there was mere dissimilarity between
the law of Oklahoma and that of California and not a collision of two
important policies. This holding was in line with the leading case of
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.3' and represents the better view. On the
other hand, there are cases in California that have held that every
legislative enactment is an expression of the public policy of this State
and that wherever there is a collision between the foreign law and
an express statute, the foreign law must yield.32 These cases are con-
trary to the Loranger decision and would probably not be followed
by the California court today.
We believe that neither Justice Traynor nor any of the other judges
writing on conflict of laws in California would hold that California's
guest statute was an expression of substantial public policy. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court on more than one occasion in recent years has
rejected the policy of preventing fraud where it was urged as a justi-
fication for the retaining of a rule of exemption of an entire class of
defendants. In Klein v. Klein the court expressly rejected this argu-
ment,33 and in Emery refused to utilize such a rationale for a proposed
rule of intra-family tort immunity.3 4
Legislature it has not been slow to act. (n.l. Thus the Legislature enacted the guest law,
now section 17158, Vehicle Code, abolishing causes of action by guests in an automobile
against the host for simple negligence, but retaining such an action based on the intoxica-
tion or willful misconduct of the host.)"
30 215 Cal. 363, 10 P.2d 63 (1932).
31224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
32 Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1949); Anderson v. Hearst Publishing
Co., 120 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon Co., 153 Cal. 438,
95 Pac. 862 (1908); Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. App. 2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (1943);
McManus v. Red Salmon Co., 37 Cal. App. 133, 137-38, 173 Pac. 1112, 1114 (1918)
(dictum). See also Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927),
criticized sharply by Traynor, supra note 24, at 670-71.
83 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); see note 29 supra.
34 Cf. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282,
286 (1952). But cf. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 310-11,
379 P.2d 513, 522-23 (1963) (fraudulent claims a factor to consider in rejecting a rule
of liability for negligently inflicted emotional stress).
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Assuming that the California court was forced to conclude that the
State of Arizona had no governmental interests, and that all of the
factors of connection were centered in California, and that at least
some policy consideration justified the legislative rule of immunity,
we must consider whether the California court would be free to adjudi-
cate the particular controversy before it, or whether it would feel
compelled to establish a rule of choice of laws for all cases involving
similar connective factors. In other words, would the court attempt
to work out a proper law of the tort?35
The better assumption is that the court would refuse to find itself
bound by a categorical imperative and would adjudicate the case at
hand. The court would probably then conclude that since there was
no likelihood of collusion between the executor of Don's estate and
Donna on the one hand, and the children of Peter and Paula on the
other, the California rule need not be applied. If the court decided
that it wanted to apply California law, it might well utilize the think-
ing of Justice Traynor in the landmark case of Bernkrant v. Fowler.3 6
The court there held that the foreign rule was the better one because
it would protect the justified expectations of the parties even though
there were many substantial contacts with California and there was
a direct collision between the Statute of Frauds of California and that
of Nevada.
Another tool the California court might feel constrained to use
is the oft-cited maxim that legislation is prima facie territorially lim-
ited in its scope.3 7 It is conceded that such a ruling would be more
in keeping with the vested rights thinking criticized by Justice Traynor
in his recent pronouncements in the field, than it would be in line
with the writings of Professor Currie and other bright lights in the
new conflict of laws spectrum. Nonetheless, we would be more in-
clined to expect the sympathetic appeal generated in favor of the
innocent children of Peter and Paula to prevail. We cannot ignore the
fact that the supreme court of this State is unquestionably a plaintiff-
oriented court, particularly with the resignation of some of the more
conservative older judges and the appointment of such liberal justices
as Justices Peters and Tobriner.
35 See Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959
(1952); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HUAv. L. REv. 881 (1951).
3655 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961), 49 CALIF. L. REv. 962.
37 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); Ryan v.
North Alaska Salmon Co., 153 Cal. 438, 95 Pac. 862 (1908); Gordon v. Reynolds, 187
Cal. App. 2d 472, 10 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1960) (wrongful death statute not applied to a
death on the high seas).
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There is yet another argument which might incline the court to
favor the plaintiffs in the hypothetical case. In Babcock the choice
was between a rule granting absolute immunity to the defendant and
one at the opposite pole imposing liability for ordinary negligence.
In the case at hand the choice would not be so simple. It could well
be argued that the court would be called upon to choose between two
only slightly different rules of duty of care. Neither the Arizona rule
nor the California rule grants an absolute immunity to the host. The
difference between the two statutes is that in California the host need
only refrain from willful misconduct or drunk driving, whereas in
Arizona he must refrain from ordinary negligence. There is language
in the Babcock opinion to support the argument that if the choice is
between two rules of duty of care, the law of place of wrong rather
than that of the domicile of the parties should be utilized. 8 In this
connection it is interesting to note that in Emery Justice Traynor was
presented with an opportunity to reject the law of place of wrong in
choosing between the guest statutes of California and Idaho. He chose
the law of the place of wrong rather than the law of the domicile,
citing Loranger v. Nadeau as authority.9
On the other hand we must not ignore the fact that Justice Traynor
favors the approach of Professor Currie. Under Currie's view the case
would be decided by the application of forum law, not because the
forum happens to have more dominant interest, not because a group-
ing of contacts would result in the application of California law, but
simply because that state was the forum and had a legitimate govern-
mental interest. Professor Currie has expressed his views of choice
of laws as follows:
1. When a court is asked to apply the law of a foreign state dif-
ferent from the law of the forum, it should inquire into the policies
expressed in the respective laws, and into the circumstances in which
it is reasonable for the respective states to assert an interest in the
application of those policies. In making these determinations the
court should employ the ordinary processes of construction and inter-
pretation.
2. If the court finds that one state has an interest in the applica-
tion of its policy in the circumstances of the case and the other has
none, it should apply the law of the only interested state.
3. If the court finds an apparent conflict between the interests
of the two states it should reconsider. A more moderate and re-
8 12 N.Y.2d at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
39 In fairness it must be noted that Emery did not present a true conflicts problem.
There was no difference between the laws of Idaho and of California. Thus it was un-
necessary for the court to make any choice.
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strained interpretation of the policy or interest of one state or the
other may avoid conflict.
4. If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict be-
tween the legitimate interest of the two states is unavoidable, it
should apply the law of the forum.
5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict exists
between the interests of two other states, and the court cannot with
justice decline to adjudicate the case, it should apply the law of the
forum, at least if that law corresponds with the law of one of the
other states. Alternatively, the court might decide the case by a
candid exercise of legislative discretion, resolving the conflict as it
believes it would be resolved by a supreme legislative body having
power to determine which interest should be required to yield.
6. The conflict of interest between states will result in different
dispositions of the same problem, depending on where the action is
brought. If with respect to a particular problem this appears seriously
to infringe a strong national interest in uniformity of decision, the
court should not attempt to improvise a solution sacrificing the legiti-
mate interest of its own state, but should leave to Congress, exercising
its powers under the full faith and credit clause, the determination of
which interest shall be required to yield.40
Although the Supreme Court of California might decide this case
on the basis of Currie's point two, or point four (either that California
had an interest in the application of its law and that Arizona had none,
or that there was a conflict of the legitimate interests of the two states)
we are constrained to believe that it would not so rule. Essentially the
problem would be one of adjudicating a particular case and doing
justice to the parties before the court, and the court would probably
decide in favor of the plaintiffs and then, perhaps reasoning back
from the result to the rationale, explain its decision on one of the
bases discussed above.
Wrongful Death Limitations-Will CaliforniaAdopt Kilberg and Pearson?
The second question posed by our hypothetical case is whether a
California court would feel obliged to apply a foreign law limiting
wrongful death damages. The solution to this problem will not be
found in earlier cases which seem to follow the lex loci delicti rule
but in the much-discussed cases of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.4 1
and Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.42 In both Pearson and Kilberg
4 0 CEiATrAM, GiuswoLD, IEESE & ROSENBErEG, CASES ON CoNFLIcT oF LAWS
477-78 (5th ed. 1964).
419 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
42309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963). See Currie,
(which happen to involve the same accident) New York residents had
purchased tickets in New York City for a flight which ended short
of the Boston Airport. The plaintiff in Kilberg sought to recover dam-
ages on a theory of breach of contract which would avoid the 15,000
dollar wrongful death limitation of Massachusetts. The majority of
the New York Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's contract theory,
but held that the plaintiff could recover full damages under the law
of New York despite Massachusetts' attempt to limit damages. The
New York Court of Appeals placed the decision, in part at least, on a
characterization of wrongful death limitations as procedural rather
than substantive. This untenable basis for a sound decision was aban-
doned in the later case of Davenport v. Webb.43 Thus, the Kilberg
decision now stands for the naked proposition that a wrongful death
limitation found to be contrary to the public policy of the forum will
be rejected, at least where the plaintiff and the decedent were resi-
dents of the forum state and where there are other significant con-
tacts in the forum.44
Pearson specifically held that the wrongful death limitation of
Massachusetts would not be applied by a federal court sitting in New
York and rejected the argument that Kilberg failed to comply with
the full faith and credit clause. Judge Kaufman's extensive and well-
thought-out decision in Pearson better explains the result in both cases
than does the Kilberg language. The more reasonable prognostication
is that California will follow the Kilberg-Pearson rule when the prob-
lem is squarely presented in this State.
It must be conceded that California, unlike New York, has no
constitutional provision prohibiting limitations of wrongful death
damages. Furthermore, the California courts have held that mere
differences between the statutory rule of the forum and that of the
foreign state are not sufficient justification for the rejection of the
foreign law. Only where the foreign rule would be so repugnant to
California policy as to "violate some fundamental principal of justice,
some prevalent concept of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of
the common weal" must the foreign law be refused application.45
Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in N.Y., 1963 Du= L.J. 1; Comment, 61 COLum. L. REV.
1497 (1961); Comment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 723 (1961); Note, 49 CAuF. L. REV. 187
(1961); Note, 46 CommRLL L.Q. 637 (1961); Note, 74 HA.M L. REv. 1652 (1961);
Note, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 670, 674 (1963); Note, 47 VA. L. REV. 692 (1961).
43 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
44 But see Gore v. Northeast Airlines Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(dictum that California would probably not follow Kilberg).
4 5 Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 366, 10 P.2d 63, 65 (1932) (quoting Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918)); accord, Rubin v.
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Nonetheless, we believe that the California court would hold that
this State's wrongful death statute expresses public policy of a funda6-
mental nature, and that this statute, together with the policy expressed
by the Civil Code maxim that for every wrong there is a remedy46
requires that a fulI recovery be awarded to the children of Peter and
Paula.47
There are several other avenues by which the California court
might reach the Kilberg-Pearson result. The court might reject the
lex loci delicti rule and, using the "grouping of contacts" test of the
Restatement Second, select California law because of the prepon-
derance of significant contacts in this State. To do so the court would
have to overrule the Gordon v. Reynolds8 holding that the wrongful
death statute of California would not apply to an accident on the
high seas, as well as the many cases giving at least lip service to the
lex loci rule.
Another approach would be that of Currie's "Restrained and
Enlightened Forum" whereby the forum would resolve the conflict
by holding that the forum's interest must dominate, 49 since the forum
has a legitimate governmental interest in the application of its rule.
In short, we believe that whatever the theoretical basis for the
decision, California would reach the result in the Kilberg and Pearson
cases.
Owner's Responsibility-Scheer v. Rockne Motors
v. Common Sense
The third question facing the California court would be whether
it would apply the owner's responsibility statute of Ontario, New
York, California, or no statute whatsoever. The argument on behalf
of Donna would be that she never consented to the application of
Ontario law and thus it would be unconstitutional to subject her to
that owner's responsibility statute. This was the holding in Scheer v.
Rockne Motors.0 Victor v. Sperry"' is in accordance with Scheer, al-
though distinguishable on its facts. 2
Schupp, 127 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1942); Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 48 Cal. App. 2d 12,
119 P.2d 214 (1941).
46 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3523.
4 7 Cases cited note 32 supra.
48 187 Cal. App. 2d 472, 10 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1960).
49 Currie, supra note 22; M. Traynor, supra note 22.
50 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
51 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (1958).
52 See Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of
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In Scheer it was held that the law of the place of wrong could
not be applied to owner's responsibility unless it could be proved
that the New York owner had expressly authorized the driver to take
the car out of New York and to Ontario (this in spite of the fact that
the local law of both New York and Ontario imposed liability for the
torts of a permissive user). Thus, the Second Circuit refused to apply
the lex loci delicti unless the owner could be shown to have willingly
submitted thereto and, more important, refused to apply the other
law which might have been used to fill the gap. 8 Evidently the court
felt that the New York owner's responsibility statute could have no
extraterritorial application; it was either the law of the place of wrong
or no law whatsoever.
Victor reached a similar result although it did not involve the
question of submission to the law of another state. In Victor the acci-
dent involved three California parties: the plaintiff, the tort feasor,
and the owner. Mexico was the locus of the accident. The District
Court of Appeals held that the Mexican law of owner's responsibility
which did not require proof of culpability on the part of the tort
feasor could not apply because it was contrary to the public policy
of this State. As in Scheer, the California court ignored the possible
application of California's owner's responsibility statute.
These decisions might be explained on a territorialistic theory, i.e.,
a refusal to extend a statute beyond the boundaries of the state enact-
ing it. Each of the two decisions was in fundamental error. If the
court decides that it cannot or will not apply the lex loci delicti, must
a.gap then ensue?54 To hold that an owner can escape responsibility
for use of his vehicle where he could reasonably expect when he
entrusted the car that he would be liable for an accident under the
law of his own domicile is to engage in falacious, mechanistic think-
ing. There is no constitutional bar to California extending the opera-
tion of its statutes beyond its boundaries, and there is no good policy
reason for refusing to apply a statute when a gap would otherwise
exist. The proper rule would be to apply either the owner's responsi-
bility statute of Ontario or California, and the preferable law would
Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595, 601-04
(1960).
63 This submission test is inconsistent with the general rule of vicarious liability
whereby an owner may be held liable where his borrower, although having consent to
begin with, uses the car in a forbidden place. EmqzwEIG, CoN_.icr OF LAWS § 219
(1962); 2 HARPER & J AmES, TORTS § 26.16 (1956).
54 See M. Traynor, supra note 22, at 849 n.22 ("lacuna" where policies of both
states are limited to local situations).
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be the one by which both parties reasonably expected to be governed,
i.e., the law of California.
Conclusion
In spite of the myriad cases giving lip service to Restatement,
section 377,15 and all the eminent writers who have defended this
rule, we submit that the law of California should and will take up
the pace of the rapid-moving development in the choice of laws as
to torts, and break loose from the rigid rule of the law of the place
of wrong. Actually California has already embarked on such a course
and it requires only that the court give honest recognition to the fact
that it is time to shake free the shackles of a mechanical rule which
failed to give regard to legitimate state interests. As Justice Traynor
concluded in his speech to the students and faculty of the University
of Texas Law School in 1959:
As we now fimsh one long servitude to categorical imperatives, we
should be on the guard against another. The law of conflicts has been
kept in its infancy all too long to survive another deep freeze. It has a
chance at last to develop freely. Only as progressive case law accu-
mulates can we gain the necessary perspective for determining the
areas in which conflicting state interests so chromcally threaten inter-
state harmony as to call for federal legislation.
... The responsible court will have to be on its mettle. It must
be prepared to reject unrealistic rules, yet cautious enough not to
make formulations that reach too zealously into the future or to give
too zealous a scope to local policy. It must distinguish between real
and spurious conflicts at the outset. It must temper its freedom to
declare local policy and its scope with a sense for harmonious inter-
state relations as well as for the justifiable expectations of the
parties. 56
Those words should be given heed by any California lawyer faced
with a choice of laws problem today.
55 See note 9 supra.
56 Traynor, supra note 24, at 675.
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Appendix
The following tables of differing substantive tort rules illustrate the need
for careful checking to determine whether a case with interstate elements
does present a true or spurious conflict of laws problem. The attempt has
been made to select states which would most often be involved with Cali-
fornia plaintiffs or defendants, depending on the particular tort involved.
MoToR VEmcr.E Lm mrrY STATuTEs
Permissive Direct
Use Action
State Statute Statute Guest Statute
California Yes No Yes-intoxication or
willful misconduct
Yes;
family car
Yes;
family car
No;
master-servant
relationship or
common law agency;
no family car
doctrine
Doubtful
Yes
Yes;
agency and family
purpose
No; common law
liability;
no family purpose
No (same as Illinois)
No No--ordinary care
No Same as California
No Yes-Willful and wanton
misconduct
Yes No-ordinary care
No No-ordinary care
No Yes-gross negligence or
intoxication
No Yes-intoxication or
recklessness
No Yes-intoxication or
willful misconduct
No Yes-intoxication or
willful, intentional
misconduct
E 58 1
Arizona
Colorado
Illinois
Louisiana
New York
Oregon
Texas
Utah
Washington
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DAMAGES iN PERSONAL INjURY AND WONGFUL DEATH ACrIONS
Punitive Damages
Wrongful Death Interest as for Negligently
Limitation on Element of Caused Injuries
State Damages Damages or Death
California Pecuniary loss No No
No maximum
Arizona Fair No No
Illinois Pecuniary loss No No
Maximum $30,000
Massachusetts Maximum $20,000 Yes Yes-wrongful death
Nevada Fair No No
Oregon Maximum $25,000 No No
New Jersey Pecuniary loss No No
No maximum
Missouri Maximum $15,000 No Yes
Washington Pecuniary loss No No
No maximum
